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BOOK REVIEW
STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE
By E. D. G. Ribble, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia.
Columbia University Press, 1937. pp. 266.

To paraphrase Mr. Ribble's own words, the purpose of his work, State and
National Power Over Commerce, "is to view the division of power (between
federal and state governments) in the present, in the light of . . . evolution
through the past."' In a word, this book is an attempt to discuss the effect
of history- economic, scientific, social- on the Supreme Court. In this effort
the author succeeds in large measure and helps to explain, if not to justify, what
often appear to be arbitrary legalistic conceptions. Unfortunately, however, the
objective of the writer is rendered difficult and, at times, almost impossible because of the fact, as the book recognizes, that constitutional law "is to a striking
extent the product of judicial manufacture," 2 and the reflection of social, economic, and political views of the varying personnel of the court. There is too
much of constitutional law that cannot be traced convincingly to mere evolution
and which, to use the words of Mr. Ribble, may be characterized as "arbitrary."s
Even so, Mr. Ribble's work is a valuable contribution in so far as history has
influenced court decisions.
In discussing the origin, development, and meaning of the term "direct"
as used in the Schechter Case, Mr. Ribble perhaps assumes too freely the propriety and darity of the application of the term by the Supreme Court. Especially
does this seem true in the light of the recent Wagner Act Cases. It is submitted,
with all due respect to his efforts, that the author's "evolutionary" explanations
are not very persuasive as to the necessity and significance of the requirement
of "directness" and that his efforts to distinguish between what is "direct" and
what is "indirect" is of little utility so far as application to future cases is concerned. The author glibly states that the question "depends upon the Court's
determination of the intimacy of connection between the aspects of the activity
regulated and interstate movement, that intimacy being normally judged in the
light of practical business or economic considerations.' 4 But what business or
economic considerations? How great must the "intimacy" be? Why was there
,See Preface.
2See page 114.
8See page 134.
4

See page 134,
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more "intimacy" in the Wagner Act Cases than in the Schechter Case or Gufey
Coal Act Case?b
The suggestion is advanced that in the division of power between the federal
and state governments the general tendency has been to leave matters which can
be most advantageously handled by the states to the states and to consign t.
the central government those matters which can be dealt with by it more effectively. This proposition is no doubt true in a large measure. The author fails,
however, to give an "evolutionary" explanation regarding those constitutional
cases in which the Court has denied the existence of both federal and state
power to regulate and which heretofore have raised a "no-man's-land."
Professor Ribble properly seems to suggest that the evolution of constitutional law has been a constant "groping in the dark" to achieve a balance of
power between the state and federal governments even though the lines have
not always been carefully drawn. In this groping, historical developments have
no doubt influenced the choice of direction. As indicated in the foreward by
Robert B. Tunstall, the effect of the Supreme Court on history has been related
.lsewhere. Mr. Ribble makes a commendable and skillful attempt to show the
influence of history on the Supreme Court.
D. J. Farage
SThe reviewer has indicated more at length his views on this problem elsewhere in this

issue of the Dickinson Law Review.

